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VARIATIONS IN BURDEN OF PROOF IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
M. S. WHALEY*
One often thinks of the burden of proof as resolving itself
into two rules or two degrees of proof: one for the criminal
case known as the reasonable doubt rule, the other fdr the
civil case and known as the preponderance rule. But there
is more to it than that.
Although there is nothing complex with regard to the
state's burden, it being to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and that a reasonable doubt is such as "would arise
in the mind of an honest man who is earnestly seeking to
know the truth,"' yet when that rule has to operate con-
comitantly with one also placing a burden on the defendant
in such a case, the simplicity of the rule tends to be lost in
the dual operation.
When'the defense of insanity enters a murder situation,
one finds the preponderence rule coming into the picture and
functioning along with that of reasonable doubt as to what,
in the last analysis, is the same issuable fact, namely, a state
of mind.2 Incongruously they impinge on one another and
even the legally trained mind must with effort state their
dual functioning in the following language:
"In order to make out such defense, as it seems to
us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the
first place the presumption of sanity and then any other
proof that may be offered. This need not be done 'beyond
a reasonable doubt,' for that would be a misapplication
of the rule, which only applies to the evidence to sustain
the charge on the part of the State, but by 'the pre-
ponderance of evidence,' showing want of sanity with
reasonable certainty; this degree of evidence on the
part of the defendant answering to and satisfying the
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; Member South Carolina Bar.
Columbia, S. C.
1. State v. Bramlett, 114 S. C. 389, 103 S. E. 755 (1920).
2. State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439 (1886).
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requirement that the State must establish every element
of the crime charged 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' 'Where
the State fully proves a prima facie case, and a special
defense, such as insanity, alibi, etc., is interposed, it
must be established only by such a preponderance of
evidence as will satisfy the jury that the charge is not
sustained "beyond all reasonable doubt." ' "
One wonders what must be the mental reaction of the
untrained lay mind on the jury panel to this legal yardstick
and whether, after all, it is ever really applied.
It will be noted from the above quotation that the dual
functioning of the two rules was also mentioned as pertaining
when the defense of alibi entered the legal picture. And yet,
although it took decades for there to be recognized the utter
inconsistency of having the state prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was present when the crimd was
committed and the defendant having to prove only by a pre-
ponderance that he was not present, nevertheless the incon-
sistency was eventually recognized and the burden of prov-
ing such a defense taken off a defendant entirely. He need
now create only the necessary reasonable doubt.3
Will the time come when the defense of insanity will re-
take its place alongside that of its legal twin-alibi-and
again be subject to the same burden, or will the two, which
were in 1885 placed in the same category, henceforth follow
separate legal grooves, the one of insanity requiring a "pre-
ponderance" showing "want of sanity with reasonable cer-
tainty," while the state has to prove guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, and the other of alibi requiring only that a reason-
able doubt be cast on the issuable fact of presence of the de-
fendant?
Self-defense in the criminal side still remains in the pre-
ponderance column,4 with the consequent linguistic clang of
reasonable doubt and greater weight resounding in the con-
sciousness of the triers of fact where the two degrees of proof
-the one, the greater; the other, the lesser-must vie for
eventual supremacy.
Even in civil cases, there can be issues calling for the
3. State v. McGhee, 137 S. C. 256, 135 S. E. 59 (1926).
4. State v. Moss, 77 S. C. 391, 57 S. E. 1098 (1907).
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reasonable doubt rule. In 19255 the Supreme Court said, in
a suit on a bond which indemnified against "fraud, dishon-
esty, forgery, theft.. .", that "the rule is so well established
that a plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas is only re-
quired to prove his case by the greater weight of the evi-
dence as not to require even citation of authority. Any other
rule would only produce 'confusion worse confounded'. If
there be any statements in any of the cases to the effect that
the 'preponderance of evidence' rule is not universal in the
Common Pleas Court, such statement and such case is so
glaringly and utterly in opposition to the law and practice
of the Courts as to be entirely disregarded."
Judge Ramage who wrote that opinion, which had no
dissent, was at that time a circuit judge. He told the writer
that the object of the decision was to henceforth have one
rule qnly for civil causes. However, within a few years, it
was held in a slander suit as to the plea of justification that
on the civil side the rule in a criminal case was applicable.
It may be noted that the Justices were not in favor of the
result but felt compelled to make the burden as to such an
issue an exception to the rule in the Salley case. That case
was not cited, but again a unanimous opinion declared:
"The general rule in civil cases is that a party hav-
ing the burden of an issue shall succeed upon that issue
if he can bring to his aid a preponderance of the evidence.
We know of no exception to this rule in this State, except
in the case of slander where the defendant justifies the
speaking of words which charge the plaintiff with the
commission of a criminal offense. Many eminent lawyers
and jurists have condemned the rule in this class of cases.
However, the rule has been settled and followed in this
State for more than fifty years, and we feel it our duty
to give it stare decisis effect, much as we may favor
the unification of the rules of evidence. Doubtless if
the operation of the rule had resulted in general dis-
approval, a change would have been brought about by
legislation, as has been done in several other jurisdic-
tions."
5. Salley, Rec'r. v. Globe Indemnity Co., et al, 133 S. C. 342, 131
S. E. 616 (1925).
6. Smith v. Smith, 194 S. C. 247, 9 S. E. (2d) 584 (1920).
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Since in the foregoing case the Court did not see fit to
exercise its inherent power to make the common law meet its
boast of keeping abreast of the times by (as Judge Cardozo
puts it) "judicial legislation", it is left to legislative action
to accomplish the unifying objective.
Other than the exception now existing on the civil side
by virtue of the Smith case, supra, one would think, at this
point, that he could stop and rest assured that there was only
one rule as to burden of proof in civil cases. If he did, he
would be surprised. At the next turn on this portion of the
legal highway he would stumble over a yardstick to which
the court could give no definite name, but, like with defining
"tort", could only characterize. And so, one finds that we now
have with us a burden of proving an issue by "strong, cogent,
convincing evidence, more than a preponderance" (italics
added). And, one might add: less than a reasonable doubt.
This burden is an unnamed "betwixt and between". It
functions in fraud and breach of trust cases.7
There is another rule, also unnamed but characterized and
to be found only through the means, namely, the evidence
necessary to attain it. It is obviously much more than a pre-
ponderance and a little less than beyond a questionable doubt.
So much one gathers from a recent opinion in a case involv-
ing specific performance of a parol contract to devise prop-
erty.8 The Court said in the case just noted:
"Courts do not countenance specific performance of
parol contracts to devise unless the evidence compels con-
viction that there was such a contract and that it has
been performed by the promisee unless complete per-
formance becomes impossible through no fault of the
latter. The ordinary rule of preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence, applicable to civil actions gen-
erally, is insufficient in this class of cases; some Courts
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as on the crim-
inal side; universally a higher degree of conviction of
truth is necessary than in the usual civil case."
7. Searson v. Webb, 208 S. C. 453, 38 S. E. (2d) 654 (1946).
B. Ycag v. Levy, 206 S. C. 1, 32 S. E. (2d) 889 (1945).
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Also, in the same opinion:
"The terms of such an agreement should be definite
and certain and established by evidence clear and con-
vincing."
As to cases for reformation of written instruments where
the issues of mistake and mutuality are involved, there is
yet another unnamed but only characterized yardstick, which
appears to, be nearer the preponderance and, therefore by
that much, farther removed from the beyond a reasonable
doubt. Both such issues must be proved by "clear and con-
vincing testimony." 9
In workman's compensation cases,1o there are times when
the measure of proof changes. It is nearer the preponderance
than the reasonable doubt, in that a claimant, when depend-
ing on expert opinion testimony, must show a casual con-
nection between the accident and his injury was "most prob.
able"; not that the greater probab'lity should be that there
was such a connection, which latter is the normal criterion
of a "preponderance".
One wonders what South Carolina would do regarding
the degree of proof necessary in pedigree cases for establish-
ing a declarant's connection with the family which is the
subject of his declaration. Elsewhere, when the problem has
arisen, it has been solved by swinging the burden of proof
pendulum far to the other side of the legal arc and requiring
only slight proof." To require anything like a preponderance
.would usually work an injustice. As said in the case just
noted:
"It may prove a hardship now and then to require
even slight evidence of the relationship of a decedent
to the family of which he declares before his declarations
will be received, but the consequences of the contrary
.rule would inevitably be much more serious."
9. Moore v. Jeffords, 195 S. C. 512, 12 S. E. (2d) 737 (1941).
10. Ashley v. S. C. Highway Department, 213 S. C. 354, 49 S. E.
(2d) 505 (1948).
11. Aalholm v. People, 211 N. Y. 408; 105 N. E. 647 (1914).
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